Open Appeal to the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Law Enforcement Authorities on Ensuring the Security of Telecommunications Networks

Precedent

As a result of an incident on July 21st, which appeared to be unauthorized access to journalist Oleg Gusev's personal Telegram account, the SIM card he had replaced on Beeline's recommendation stopped working. A similar incident on July 27th also resulted in the deactivation of the new SIM card (USIM, 4G).

In its reply of 18 August 2025 to Mr. Gusev, KaR-Tel LLP (Beeline) stated that the reason for the disconnection of his SIM cards on 21 and 27 July could have been “technical failures, operating system updates, or malfunctions of technical partners.” However, such wording raises justified doubts.

First, the indicated dates do not coincide, which points to the recurring nature of the disconnections.

Second, the company does not provide any information on whether the failures were widespread or local, which is uncharacteristic of genuine technical problems.

Third, the reply contains no specifics as to which systems or partners could have been the source of the failures.

According to generally accepted technical standards, modern SIM cards with 3G/4G support have built-in protection against remote cloning, which calls into question the sufficiency of the explanation of a simple “failure.” The nature of the incident resembles signs usually observed in cases of unauthorized SIM card reissuance (the so-called SIM-swap attack). Taking this into account, we believe there are grounds to verify the version of possible unauthorized SIM card reissuance. In this regard, we consider it necessary to conduct an independent review by the competent authorities.

Why is this important?

Based on the above, the International Foundation for Protection of Freedom of Speech “Adil Soz” believes that this case raises issues that go beyond an individual incident and may indicate potential vulnerabilities in Kazakhstan’s telecommunications networks. This is especially relevant in terms of SIM card protection and the ability of operators to counter illegal reissuance and cloning, as well as possible risks of unauthorized use of special equipment for interception or interference in telecommunications. It also creates risks of declining trust in the infrastructure, given that citizens’ SIM cards are linked to a range of government and banking services.

Appeal

The International Foundation for Protection of Freedom of Speech “Adil Soz” expresses serious concern regarding attempts of unauthorized access to the messenger accounts of a Kazakhstan journalist, accompanied by the deactivation of SIM cards. We regard this case not only as a threat to a specific individual, but also as a signal of potential threats to the integrity of the trust system in the country’s digital space.

We call on:

1. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan to conduct a review of this incident and, if grounds exist, to initiate a pre-trial investigation in accordance with the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Given that in international practice SIM card reissuance is often linked to physical intervention, we trust that law enforcement bodies will be able to establish the real circumstances of the case within the territory of Kazakhstan.

2. The Ministry of Digital Development, Innovation and Aerospace Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan to review the resilience of telecommunications operators’ infrastructure.

3. The mobile operator Beeline to ensure full cooperation with the investigation, including by providing all information permitted by law concerning possible actions with the SIM card and its replacement, as well as to conduct an internal review of SIM card reissuance procedures and, if necessary, present its results to the regulator.

4. In the event the incidents are confirmed to be connected with Interfering with legal professional activity of journalist — to consider, if grounds exist, the possibility of qualifying the offence under Article 158 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

We request the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan to take this case under its control and, if the possibility of SIM card reissuance or deactivation without proper verification is identified, to eliminate vulnerabilities in authentication procedures during SIM reissuance. In case of unlawful use of special equipment, we ask that all necessary measures be taken in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan.